Dewey and the Project of Critical Social Theory by Kent, Robert J.
··:.:r.·.'·..
·,····.·.,·,·.·,1··,···",::·'
,
:~F.
~. r
·',:1:
DEWEY AND THE PROJECT OF CRITICAL
SOCIAL THEORY*
ROBERT J. IZENT
University of Kansas
Social Thought & Research, 2000, Vol. 23, 1&2
Abstract
The project of critical social theory shares with progressive (bllt not
classical, free 1Harket) liberalism a value-orientation composed ofan
egalitarian conception of socialjustice; a positive, delJelopmental vie1v of
libertY as selfrealization; and a participatory notion of democracy.
Differentiating critical theory fro»: all strains of liberalism is the
comsction that capitalism cannot StljJport theinstitutionalieation of this
value-orientation, and that tinder modern conditions onlY some form of
democratic socialism can. Given thisualue-orientation, thispaperoutlines
the mission and struaur:of theproject of critical theory. In its RJOSt
recent retreat to the academy, practitioners have losttoud: not onlY 1vith
its mission but also lvith the level ofhistorical specificity at wbicb the
project can RIOSt effectivelY bepracticed. TIl/O proposals aresuggestedfor
recoverilJg and executing its mission. Thefirst is to address citizens in
particular societies about the mora! and political significance of
contemporary social change. The second is that theory, description,
critique, and vision should proceed at a level ofabstraction I callregi1lle
analYsis. Here the object ofanalYsis is a specific society with its own
history, institutionalfeatures; and cultura! identity. It is suggested that
John Dewey': proposals for the retitalization of philosophy are relevant
to the recovery of theproject of critical social theory. Following Dewf!Y j
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lead, it is suggested in the conclusion that the execution of theproject's
mission requires that reflection about the prospects of
democratic sociaNS"I in the United States build IIpon a
description and critique of the existing regiuJe.
DEWEY AND THE PROJECT OF CRITICAL
SOCIAL THEORY
Critical social theorists want to make history. They want their ideas
to enlighten and motivate political mobilization for progressive so-
cial change. Committed to justice, liberty and democracy, critical
theorists aspire to educate the political judgment of citizens seeking a
fuller realization of these values in their societies.t Considered his-
torically, "in the broadest terms," writes Brian Fay, critical theory "is
an attempt to understand . . . the oppressive features of a society
such that this understanding stimulates its audience to transform their
society and thereby liberate thernselves/" Toward the end of Democ-
rary andCapitaliss» Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis state that while
their "project has been almost entirely theoretical, [their] intent is
eminently practical: to forge tools to help understand the present
trajectory ofour societies and thereby to contribute to the possibility
of a society of popular sovereignty and liberty,"?
The focus of this paper is on the mission and structure of critical
social theory. But clarifying its mission of educating citizens and
identifying the components of critical theory qua theory is not
sufficient to differentiate this project from opposing forms of
social and political theory whose mission and structure are very
similar. Three features differentiate critical theory from its ri-
vals. First, an egalitarian conception to social justice is com-
bined with a positive, developmental view of liberty as individual
self-realization and a participatory notion of democracy. This is
a value-orientation with historical roots in the Judea-Christian
and republican traditions, Kant, Rousseau, and romanticism. It
is a value-orientation that finds diverse, more and less radical
voices among Christian and utopian socialists, in Marx and John
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Stuart Mill, in the Social Gospel, in the "new liberalism" of T. H.
Green, J. A. Hobson, and Herbert Croly, and in various members of
the Frankfurt School. The second feature of critical theory is the
conviction that capitalism and the culture it produces do not and
cannot support this value-orientation. Finally, critical theorists have
commonly argued that only some form of democratic socialism is
compatible with justice, liberty, and democracy properly understood.
These last two features, and the theoretical and historical analyses
upon which they rest, differentiates critical theory from progressive
liberalism however much they share in the way of moral and politi-
calvalues." .
Success in the education of citizens is constrained by factors ex-
ternal and internal to critical social theory. External factors in-
clude the receptivity of its audience and any psychological, ideo-
logical, or other cultural impediments that must be overcome in
order for the message to be received, understood, and found per-
suasive. Equally important is the power of political opponents
to dominate not only the media, but also the institutional sites of
political education and deliberation. No less significant is the
privileged access enjoyed by the opposition to the economic and
organizational resources of the state that could be used to' steer
society toward a more desirable future. All of these factors are
beyond the capacity of the theorist qua theorist to control.
By contrast, factors internal to critical social theory can be con-
trolled, and it is with these factors that this paper is concerned.
The reference, here, is to the philosophical, social scientific, and
imaginative dimensions of critical theory. Indeed, these dimen-
sions and their interrelations are definitive of critical theory as a
global, holistic enterprise transcending disciplinary boundaries.
As such it is continuous with a tradition of "practical philoso-
phy" with roots traceable to Plato and especially Aristotle.' Recog-
nizing this continuity, SeylaBenhabib maintains "the project of criti-
cal social theory [is] situated between practical philosophy and social
science, sharing and radically reformulating the intentions of both."?
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Since the realization of its moral and political objectives depends not
only on the removal of external impediments but also on the reason-
ableness of these philosophical, scientific, and imaginative dimen-
sions, we need to briefly clarify what the latter include. These dimen-
sions, I suggest, can be further differentiated into five aspects: theory,
description, critique, vision, and metatheory. In the following synop-
sis,I want to briefly sketch the meaning of each of these aspects. My
purpose is not to break new ground or to defend a particular posi-
tion, but rather to construct a conceptual map on which to locate the
problems I want to address.
The Project of Critical Social Theory
Whether the task is understanding the "oppressive features of
[our] society" or its "present trajectory", critical social theory
must construct and defend a general conception of technologi-
cally advanced, liberal democratic societies-a theory of how they
are structured and reproduced. Because the impediments to a
more complete realization of justice, liberty, and democracy in
these societies are linked, in part, to economic and class-based
mechanisms of disttibuting wealth and power, critical theorists
have frequently relied on a theory of capitalism-its genesis,
periodization, crisis proneness, and developmental tendencies-
to understand and explain how these mechanisms work and the
role they play in liberal democracies. But there are other, deep-
seated, impediments based on racial prejudice, gender stereotypes,
and a variety of other conventional beliefs, and values. The task
of theory is not only to grasp the nature and institutionalization
of these beliefs and prejudices, but also to articulate the linkages
between these impediments and those based on differential ac-
cess to economic, political, and cultural resources associated with
the (soci~) class structure. A further task is to understand how
world-views, ideals and wants are acquired and how they may be
self-consciously and freely changed. This latter task requires theories
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of self, moral development, popular culture and education broadly
conceived.
Necessary as theory construction is for orienting reflection on con-
temporary societies and the various impediments to equal opportu-
nities for self-realization, it is not sufficient. At some point, the criti-
cal theorist must reach beyond the collegial circle of sympathetic
intellectuals and address a public of fellow citizens who share with
the theorist a common history and a common future. In the words
of C. Wright Mills, the theorist must honor a "principle of historical
specificity" by clarifying the "public issues" in her society and by
illuminating the typical "personal troubles" among its members," As
Mills insisted, clarification and illumination requires not only persua-
sive description, the second aspect of critical theory, but also looking
at present issues and troubles from a distance-a reflective distance
built upon an understanding of a specific nation's history and an
analysis of its sociological and psychological deep structure. Of
course this holisticinvestigation, likeallempirical investigation, isguided
by theory explicit or implied; but the focus of this aspect is descrip-
tive. The interest, here, is not a general theory of "late capitalism,"
but r~ther a description of the present stage of capitalism in the
United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, or some other
country; not the plight of the post-modern self, but the situation of
contemporary Italian women or members of the British underclass.
Theoretical and descriptive analyses contribute to the political
intent of critical social theory by providing the knowledge and
perspective necessary for the third aspect: critique. The latter is
a many-sided appraisal of present society based on a commit-
ment to justice, liberty, and democracy. The multiple forms of
critique or appraisal can be divided into three types. One type is
concerned with what may be called systemic rationality. Can
present society reproduce itself without structural contradictions
and institutional crises of one kind or another? Are its economic
and political institutions of societal coordination and collective
decision-making efficient and effective in the face of significant
change in the political economy of the world? Such questions are
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clearly meaningless and unanswerable in the absence of theoretical
and descriptive analysis.
A second type of criticism under various headings of "immanent
critique," "defetishizing critique," and "Ideologiekritic," identifies exist-
ing social structural and ideological impediments which prevent or
inhibit a fuller realization of justice, liberty,and democracy" Finally,a
third type identifies developmental tendencies and possibilities point-
ing to alternative "trajectories" of contemporary societies into the
future. The question is: Which of these possible futures holds the
greatest promise for a more complete institutionalization of these
values? Bowles and Gintis speak for most critical theorists when
they argue that the moral and political objectives of critical social
theory "will come to fruition, if at all, not through the substitution of
the unprecedented for the familiar, but in the transformation of the
present and in the development of structures and meanings already
prefigured ill todayssociety and discourse,"?
Critique, I said, is based on commitment to justice, liberty, and
democracy. But commitment, here, is not to abstract,
transhistorical ideals however reasonably defined, Commitment
implies conceptions of justice, liberty, and democracy that build
upon an appropriation of culturally indigenous moral, political,
and philosophical traditions.to It also implies a more or less articulate
vision of the economic, political, and educational institutions neces-
sary for these historically rooted ideals to be realized and repro-
duced; that is, it implies a rather explicit model of a good society
based upon existing developmental possibilities and the appropri-
ated value orientation. Political vision, in this sense, according to
Sheldon Wolin,is "essentiallyarchitectonic." It constitutes the imagi-
native dimension of critical theory and one of its principal links with
the classical tradition of practical philosophy. In its work of con-
structing normative institutional models, political vision reveals the
meaning of justice, liberty, and democracy , providing, as it were, the
normative standards for criticizing present society and evaluating the
alternative developmental paths that lie before it. II
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In specifying the theoretical, descriptive, critical,and visionary aspects
of critical social theory, it is imperative not to lose sight of its moral
and political objectives. Seyla Benhabib's statement of these objec-
tives is typical. Critical theory, she writes,
addresses the needs and demands expressed by social actors
in the present, and interprets their potential to lead toward
a better and more humane society.... [A] critical social
theory is not exclusively interested in impersonal forces that
act behind the backs of social agents, but in showing how
such forces generate certain experiences of suffering, hu-
miliation, aggression, and injustice, which in turn can lead
to resistance, protest, and organized struggle.12
Benhabib reduces to two the four aspects of critical theory I have
defined. She calls them the "explanatory-diagnostic' and "antici-
patory-utopian" aspects. The purpose of the first is "~ri.sis diag-
nosis;" i.e., the provision of an analysis of "the contradictions and
dysfunctions of ... present [society]" and an explication of "the
protests and pathologies-as the case may be-which they give rise
to in the population." The anticipatory-utopian aspect "constitutes
the more properly normative [dimension] of critique." Crisis diag-
nosis is alwayscarried out "in the name of a better future and a more
humane society." In other words, "critical social theory views the
present from the perspective of the radical transformation of its
basic structure, and interprets actual, lived crises and protests in light
of an anticipated future.?" While I am sympathetic to Benhabib's
analysis, I believe that meeting the practical objectives ofcritical theory
requires addressing the "needs and demands" of individuals a~d
groups in historicallY specific situations. This means that at. some P~11lt
critical theory must describe and criticize existing societies at a fairly
concrete level of abstraction-a level on which cultural and political
features that are definitive of particular societies are relevant to the
critical analysis because they are constitutive of their members as
citizens. Critical theorists may need a theo')l of the "life-world" as
Benhabib following Habermas insists; but they also need empirically
accurate, descriptive a11aIYses of historically specific life-worlds-hence
7
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our differentiation of theory and description. Benhabib states that
the anticipatory-utopian aspect of critical theory embraces the at-
tempt "to rationally articulate a more adequate form of human ex-
istence.?" I think that such exercises in political imagination should
be differentiated from the various types of critique-hence my dif-
ferentiation of the critical from the visionary aspects of critical theory.
If a given society-how it is structured, how it came to be, its
problematic features, and its future-is the subject of theory,
description, critique, and vision, then the subject of metatheory
is the project of critical social theory itself. Metatheory is the
reflexive, "self-referential" aspect of critical theory.P Among its tasks
is the clarification and defense of the moral commitments and politi-
cal objectives of the project as a whole. None of its tasks is more
essential. Not only do theory construction and description (and more
obviously, critique and vision) presuppose a relation to ideals and
values-what Weber called "value-relevance"-but also the choice
among alternative theories may reasonably depend upon value com-
mitments as well." In addition to defending particular conceptions
of justice, liberty, and democracy, therefore, the critical theorist as
metatheorist must fully clarify the implication of these commitments
for the other aspects of critical theory," No less important, how-
ever, is the additional metatheoretical task of answering the criticism
and exposing the weaknesses of opposing currents of philosophy,
ethics, political philosophy, and social science.
Another metatheoretical task is to examine the role critical theory
ought to play in progressive social change. The focus here is
upon the role of the message rather than the messenger. Whether
there is a political role for critical theorists as intellectuals apart
from their vocation as theorists is another question. IS In addition,
metatheory must consider who the principal addressees are and how
their needs, hopes, and desires constrain the articulation of theory,
description, critique, and vision." Finally, metatheory is concerned
with the identification of the conditions (social, political, and cultural)
under which the message of critical theory is most likely to be ac-
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ceptable and politically motivating to its audience.20 · In all of these
tasks critical social theory (and its history) becomes an object to itself
utilizing tools forged to explain, diagnose, and criticize contempo-
rary society in order to determine its own possibilities and prospects
as an emancipatory project.
The Trouble With Critical Social Theory Today
Among intellectuals committed to this project, there has evolved
an informal and spontaneous division of labor. For whatever
reasons-academic credentialing, professional demands, individual
talent, and personal interests-committed intellectuals tend to
specialize or at least concentrate their published work in one or
two of the five aspects of critical theory. This division of labor
makes for a diverse body of literature in several disciplines.
Diversity is not in itself troublesome, but it can be problematic.
There is a tendency for the disciplinary fragmentation within
higher education to be replicated in the "community" of critical
theorists. Those who focus on the descriptive aspects of political
economy and historical sociology normally leave to "philoso-
phers" the tasks of metatheory and vise versa. Consequently,
the ostensibly global, holistic project of critical theory tends to
disintegrate into a loosely affiliated set of specialties. Moreover,
despite a common commitment to roughly identical political
ideals and objectives, the differences in philosophical and theo-
retical orientations are significant. Some orientations manifest a
less problematic relation to the exercise of political judgment
(and to political action) than do others. In some cases, the con-
nection of this literature to the moral and political intentions
that presumably drive its production is not clear.
The problematic conditions of the project of critical social theory
raises several questions: (1) Is contemporary critical theory a source
of existential and political enlightenment sufficient to motivate and
encourage citizens to participate in movements for progressive social
9
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change? (2)Does the literature now being produced serve adequately
the practical intention of enlightenment and motivation?" (3) How
might the tendency toward the fragmentation of critical theory be
overcome?, or, How might the task of integration required by an
apparently inevitable specialization within critical theory as a collec-
tive project be accomplished?
Delvey and the Project of Critical Social Theory
cial and psychological conditions of enlightenment and motivation,
too little reflection has been expended on the implication of these
conditions for theory construction, on what Mills called "intellectual
craftsmanship" and historian James Henretta calls "rhetorical strat-
egy," and on the most appropriate media of public presentation."
Fully addressing these questions is beyond the scope of this essay
and, perhaps, the capacity of any single paper. Maybe the time
has come for another book like Gouldner's The COIning Crisis of
Western Sociology--only this time a sociological analysis and im-
manent critique of critical social theory rather than the disci-
pline of sociology." In any case, I raise these questions because I am
disturbed by the internal specialization and fragmentation, and be-
cause the first two questions articulate as problems the anxiety I sus-
pect to be widespread about the condition and future of critical
theory particularly in the United States.
Despite signs of intellectual vitality-the international, interdis-
ciplinary impact of Habermas, numerous journals, endless ex-
egesis of Marx and western Marxism, on-going debate with neo-
conservatives and post-modernists-there is a pressing need for
self-criticism. Amid these signs of health, the citizens whose needs,
fears, and political confusion are theorized are litde more than
abstractions. Indeed, the intended audience of much of these
examples is not really the public audience whose emancipation
is the raison'd'etre of critical social theory. The intended audi-
ence is the "community" of professional and independent intel-
lectuals. As a result, the moral and political objectives of critical
theory are reduced to pious regulative ideals.
At the level of metatheory, a principal vehicle of self-criticism, insuf-
ficient attention has been paid to what the constituent elements of a ·.";·.:Jhl':;~,<f:.
process of popular enlightenment and motivation are. Insufficient
thought has been devoted to an identification of the appropriate
.... ';~...,,.;: .•~.;:~">».'
institutional sites for this process. Given a determination of the so-
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If anxiety about the present state of critical theory is warranted,
what must be done? The question is clearly premature in the
absence of a general recognition among sympathetic intellectu-
als that serious problems of the kind suggested exit. Moreover,
any program for the recovery of critical social theory ought to
evolve from the collaboration of all who are interested in the
revitalization of this project. To complicate matters, these con-
ditions of general recognition and collaboration presuppose an
infrastructure of organization and communication networks that
does not exist.
And yet the anxiety persists and a response cannot wait until an
appropriate infrastructure is created. I have in mind two pro-
posals of which only one will be developed in this essay. The
other would require a companion piece. Both proposals are
metatheoreticaI in that each suggests a way of redirecting the
project of critical theory. Together they focus on the internal
relations-the mutual constraints and necessary coherence-be-
tween the moral commitments and political objectives of critical
theory on one hand, and its five aspects on the other.
The first proposal-the one to be developed in a companion
piece-suggests that theory, description, critique, and vision
should proceed at a mote concrete and neglected level of abstrac- .
tion I call regime analysis. Here the object of theory, description,
critique, and vision is a specific society (or nation-state) as a totality
withits own history, institutional features, and cultural identity. Clearly,
there are other social formations at more general levels of abstrac-
tion with which critical theorists have been traditionally concerned-
capitalism,modernity, and the welfare state come to mind. Theories
11
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of these entities are essential for the study of individual regimes. But
theorization of these entities often abstracts from the definitive fea-
tures of particular countries and an exclusive concern for doing criti-
cal theory at this transnational level of abstraction inhibits the kind of
dialogue between theorist and indigenous traditions of moral and
political discourse that is essential for addressing an audience in a
specific place. Moreover, theory-building has neglected historical
analysis. Most theorists, it is true, recognize that capitalism has a
history with stages or phases of development." What is missing are
the national differences which can only be demonstrated through
comparative and historical analyses sensitive to definitive institutional
and cultural features. 25
Regime analysis has two tracks-one descriptive, the other nor-
mative. The first track produces an examination of the institu-
tional contours of an existing regime. It will, of necessity, draw
upon the resources of historical sociology and cultural history.26 While
the analysis strives for empirical accuracy, it is obviously not value-
neutral because the whole purpose is to highlight those aspects of the
regime that are problematic from the moral and political perspective
that drives the research and critical interpretation. The second track
is the work of the visionary aspect of critical theory. Here the pur-
pose is to envision a desirable and feasible regime toward which the
existing regime could be moved by political intervention as well as
institutional design and reconstruction. Stephen Elkin calls this exer-
cise in political imagination, "good society analysis."27 Neither Elkin
nor I, however, proposes a free-floating imagination. Instead, the
work of good society analysis is disciplined by a moral and political
standpoint that is itself a critical appropriation of cultural traditions
indigenous to the existing regime. Repeating the words of Bowles
and Gintis, the desired regime "will come to fruition, if at all, not
through the substitution of the unprecedented for the familiar, but in
the transformation of the present and in the development of struc-
tures and meanings already prefigured in today's society and dis- -
course."28
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Like the first, the second proposal would have the effect of making
more immediate the connections between theorists and their own
societies without loss of critical distance. Here the focus is upon
those features of the project that establish a purchase on the signifi-
cance and existential meaning of contemporary social change. These
features bear a family resemblance to those of a broader and more
ecumenical conception of social theory. In a recent essay, for ex-
ample, Jeffrey Alexander has emphasized the "interpenetration of
science and ideology in social theory." Social theory, Alexander states,
not only explains the social world, it also interprets it; and theory
interprets this world "in a manner that providers] 'meaning and mo-
rivation'."?" The ideological dimension provides grounding for the
interpretive work. The assumption is that there is a need for "mean-
ing"-a need, that is, for intellectual and moral coherence in the face
of the insecurities, uncertainties, risks, cultural pluralism, and political
differences that define human existence in contemporary advanced
societies. In a similar vein, Fred Block has written that
individuals cannot do without some kind of conception of
the type of society in which they live. In modern societies,
social theory plays an indispensable role in providing us
with a roadmap to our social environment."
The roadmap, however, is not only conceptual in the sense of
providing a vocabulary for understanding the structural and cul-
tural features of contemporary society. The roadmap of critical
social theory is also animated by a moral and political perspec-
tive-a substantive view of the meaning of liberty, justice, and
democracy. It is this perspective that establishes a purchase on the
moral and political significance of contemporary social change.
Regarding the project of good society analysis-the visionary track
of regime analysis-I stated that this perspective (or standpoint) is
itself an appropriation of cultural traditions indigenous to the exist-
ing regime. The second proposal for reconstructing critical social
theory, then, is to align it with a defensible form of historicism." I
believe that American pragmatism, particularly the moral and politi-
cal philosophy of John Dewey, provides a reasonable point of de-
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parture. Building upon this legacy could restore the linkage between
the telos and the practice of critical theory.
The following section outlines Dewey's understanding of the
mission of philosophy and how that mission might contribute
to a reconstruction of American society in a desirable direction.
. In order to fulfill its mission, Dewey argues, philosophy must
practice a type of cultural hermeneutics-a practice that puts
Dewey squarely in the historicist camp.f Moral and political phi-
losophy becomes thereby a form of critical social theory whose
purpose is to interpret for citizens and communities the implica-
tions and consequences of social change.
In the conclusion I return to the proposal for regime analysis. I
suggest that a critical theory that builds upon the reflexive his-
toricism inherent in Dewey's pragmatisim requires both tracks
of regime analysis. I do not claim that Dewey was himself a
theorist of the American regime in any systematic way; nor do I
claim that Dewey engaged more than suggestively in the vision-
ary project of institutional design or good society analysis. How-
ever, his impatience with concepts of "society in general," his
recognition of the moral significance of institutions as they "op-
erate under given conditions of definite time and place," and his
insistence upon "substituting inquiry into . . . specific, changing,
and relative facts (relative to problems and purposes, not meta-
physically relative) for ... manipulation of general notions,'"
suggest the level of abstraction and historical specificity upon which
theoretical and descriptive analyses of existing regimes should pro-
ceed.P By examining and clarifying regime-specific traditions of
moral and political discourse, and by disclosing immanent possibili-
ties of progressive social reconstruction in existing institutions, re-
gime analysis of the first track prepares the ground and provides the
materials necessary for social criticism and the disciplined projections
of political imagination. Dewey's historicism-what James
Kloppenberg calls his "historical sensibility"-provides the founda-
14
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cion for both examining the existing regime and designing a desirable
and feasible one."
John Deiuey: Toward a Recovery of Critical Social Theory
Two sources from the middle of Dewey's lengthy career provide
a helpful beginning. In both "The Need For A Recovery of
Philosophy" (1917) and Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920),
Dewey is concerned about the kind of relationship that should
exist between philosophers and the socio-economic and intellec-
tual milieu in which they work. In both pieces (though more
explicitly in the later one) he is acutely conscious of the recent
transition in the United States from a segmented, decentralized,
and agrarian political economy to one that is more interdepen-
dent, pluralistic, and increasingly based on applied science and
large organizations. His message is critical and programmatic.
The project of philosophy has become irrelevant beyond the circle
of professional practitioners. Philosophy, Dewey argues, lacks
clear purpose; it has lost touch with its constantly changing mi-
lieu. Philosophers, therefore, must reconstitute their project if
the latter is to contribute to a humane and progressive recon-
struction of their societies in response to recent economic, scien-
tific, and institutional developments. Those interested in restor-
ing the connection between the purpose and practice of critical
social theory should consider what Dewey had to say:
Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for
dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a
method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealingwith the prob-
lems of men.... There are human difficulties of an urgent,
deep-seated kind which may be clarified by trained reflection,
and whose solution may be forwarded by the careful develop-
ment of hypotheses. When it is understood that philosophic
thinking is caught up in the actual course of events, having the
office of guiding them towards a prosperous issue, problems
willabundantly present themselves. Philosophy will not solve
these problems; philosophy is vision, imagination, reflection-
and these functions, apart from action, modify nothing and
hence resolvenothing. But in a complicated and perverseworld,
15
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action which is not informed with vision, imagination, and
reflection is more likely to increase confusion and conflict than
to straighten things out."
Th.e scope of "human difficulties" and "problems" Dewey thought
p~llosophy should address is broad. Borrowing from C. Wright
MIlls, they range from the typical "personal troubles" of indi-
viduals caused by threats to security and cherished values, to
"public issues" springing, as Dewey states, "from a clash of social
ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompat-
ible tendencies.i'" Whether problems be individual or social, Dewey
argues, philosophy should draw on the resources of "all the disci-
plines which have an intimate connexion with human conduct?"
The range of problems philosophy should address is further clari-
fied by viewing Dewey's position in connection with an asser-
tion by Max Weber:
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern
men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that
have been created by 'ideas' have like switchmen, deter-
mined the tracks along which action has been pushed by
the dynamics of interests.T"
~ike Weber, Dewey recognized the inevitability of conflicting
Interests (material and ideal) resulting from historically specific
pa~erns of social stratification." Such conflicts are exacerbated by
social change. As a result, for Dewey, philosophically significant prob-
lems emerge when cultural and institutional change threatens the sat-
isfaction of material needs among the many, the structure of power
dominated by elites,and the interest of all in justice and liberty. Prob-
~ems ~lso emerge when change makes obsolete for many people the
inherited and largely religious world-views that construe "the world
order in its totality ... [as] a meaningful 'cosmos,'?"
Confronted with threatened and often conflicting material and ideal
interests "the task of future philosophy," Dewey writes, "is to clarify
men's ideas as to the social and moral strife of their own day. Its aim
16
Dew'!Y and the Project ofCritical Social Theory
is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with
these conflicts.?" The range of social, moral, and political problems
generated by conflicting interests and exacerbated by continuous so-
cial change defined the scope of personal troubles and public issues.
But modern philosophy, appropriately reconstructed, has another
(but related) task besides that of cultivating "vision, imagination, and
reflection" among those who would address these problems.
Saddled with obsolete beliefs about nature and society, the task
of philosophy is both critical and constructive. On one hand, it
ought to become "a critique of prejudices, [or] ... a critique of
basic and widely shared beliefs.T" Recognizing that "traditional be-
liefs ... are interwoven with institutional lifein its diverse forms" and
that such beliefs "sustain institutions and give them their hold on
human loyalty and purpose," an indispensable task of philosophy "is
criticism of beliefs, institutions, customs, [and] policies with respect
to their bearing upon good."43 Moreover, since belief "always in-
volves valuation, [or] preferential attachment to special types of ob-
jects and courses of action," and since beliefs and valuations "are
intimately attached to customs and institutions, partly as effects, partly
as causes, so that forces which impinge upon institutions and tend to
unsettle them have a disturbing impact upon beliefs," it is clear to
Dewey that "the most important shocks and inherent troubles of
complex and changing societies . . . have to do with conflicts of
value.T" Philosophy, therefore, in becoming a criticism of beliefs
becomes also a criticism of values and valuation in the various insti-
tutional spheres of human experience."
Philosophy as criticism prepares the ground for its own contribution
to a reconstruction of culture necessitated by the "march of industri-
alism" and "the decline of the operative forces of old standards and
ideals."46 Analogous to the manner in which former world-views
brought coherence to common beliefs, the vocation of contempo-
rary philosophy is "to bring intellectual order [to] ... the confusion
of beliefs" in modern societies caused by a "lack of adjustment
between ideas and ideals inherited from an older culture and the
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dominating interests and movements of present civilization ...."
Philosophy performs this task when it "explores the meaning of
actual conditions and possibilities [for humane development] that
inhere in them.?"
Likewise, it performs this task when it "restate[s] ... the ideals.
or spiritual elements that have been contained in the religions,
arts, literature, moralities, and polities of our traditional inherit-
ance." The point is to appropriate and interpret values and ide-
als embedded in older traditions and even obsolete world-views
"so that they bear an operative relation to the state of affairs
through which they are realizable" in the modern world. "By
the same movement of thought," Dewey continues, "existent
conditions cease to be taken as fixed, changeable only by some
external and accidental intrusion; they cease to be models and
measures of conduct.T"
Intellectual and institutional developments definitive of moder-
nity impede these efforts. "Professionalism... overspecializa-
tion, and [the] division of interests, occupations, and goods" pro-
duce "a tendency" for the "scientific, industrial, political, reli-
gious, artistic, educational, [and] moral" dimensions of social life
"to seek rigid, non-communicating compartments." In order to
counteract these tendencies toward intellectual and social fragmenta-
tion and "petrification," philosophy should become a generalized
medium of intercommunication, of mutual criticism through all-
around translation from one separated region of experience into
another. Thus philosophy as a critical organ becomes in effect a mes-
senger, a liaison officer, making reciprocally intelligible voices speak- .
ing provincial tongues, and thereby enlarging as well as rectifying the
meanings with which they are charged.49
Whether assisting in the intellectual integration of various spheres of ....,·_·:_.~;...·'_I."""·
human experience, exploring the significance ofrecent developments
in science, the economy, and the state, or appropriating "precious
values embedded in social traditions," contemporary philosophy must .._-.,.~~"~'Y1'tic-~_.
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address a cultural void..a deficit in existential meaning, expanding at
the same rate as the power of older world-views to inspire the intel-
lect and imagination declines.
This deficit in meaning, this general ignorance of the societal
implications of recent developments in science, technology, and
the national economy was, for Dewey, only one aspect of a "cri-
sis in contemporary culture.T" The forces eroding the intellectual
integrity of religiously grounded world-views were also responsible
for the rigidity and ineffectiveness, under conditions of modernity,
of premodern forms of societal integration. Based on custom, re-
ligious authority, coercion, and class domination, these forms of in-
tegration maintained and reproduced the status hierarchies, enclaves
of exclusivity, and social immobility of traditional societies. Dewey
criticized current manifestations of these forms of social rigidity from
a moral point of view But his criticism was also sociological. A
permanent state of social change caused by a conjuncture of special-
ized knowledge, technological and organizational innovation in the
economy, urbanization, international commerce and communications,
and geographical mobility required more reflexive, flexible, and adapt-
able forms of societal integration. The latter were required for the
sake of justice and individual liberty. But they were also required if
political communities were to solve public problems and achieve a
measure of control over their own futures.
Dewey's ideas of democracy, education, and planning were de-
veloped with these requirements in mind. Underlying these ideas
of integrating and steering a pluralistic, interdependent, industrial so-
ciety,as both a resource of interpretation and as a "working model,"
was the social practice of modern science. In experimental investi-
gation, "collectively tested" and "cooperatively confirmed" by an
open community of inquirers, Dewey believed he had discovered a
method of addressing problematic situations in all spheres of hu-
man experience. In the intellectual and social history of science he
thought he had found an immanent model of "organized inquiry,"
communication, and "cooperative intelligence"-a kind of collec-
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tive reflexivity analogous to the reflexivity of individuals-based on
the ideals of "free expression," "full publicity," and "toleration of
diverse views." Clearly, if modern democratic polities were to ar-
ticulate and satisfy public needs, balance diverse interests, and exert
some control over the pace and direction of social change, then they
needed to be transformed, Dewey thought, into political communi- '
ties of inquiry incorporating "an experimental social method.v'"
Policies and plans should be construed as "working hypotheses" subject
to review and revision in light of imagined and observed conse-
quences. By integrating the method of "experimental action" into its
private and public organizations, democratic societies would become
"self-repairing" social orders "which did not wait for periodic break-
downs to amend [their institutionsj.I'f
It is common for theorists of democracy to recognize that the
intelligence of a democratic polity depends upon the intelligence
of its citizens-hence the importance of education. As the neces-
sity of incorporating some form of national planning into the
government became more apparent to Dewey during the depres-
sion years of the 1930s, the connections between democracy and
education as modes of societal integration received a specific inter-
pretation in his writings. The "need for a society in which experi-
mental inquiry and planning for social ends are organically contained,"
Dewey argued, "is also the need for a new education. In the one
case as in the other, . . . there is required the cooperative use of
intelligence on a social scale in behalf of social values." A recon-
structed system of education would cultivate "the ability and the
desire to think collectively [and] to engage in social planning con-
ceived and conducted experimentally for the good of all." Of course
this particular task of education was only part of the larger mission
of developing "habits," "attitudes," "purposes," and powers of com-
munication which were "pertinent to the present scheme of social
relationships, with its intricate and far-flung interdependencies among
individuals" and which "enable[d] a democratic society to maintain
itself: progressively and aggressively."53
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From both moral and sociological standpoints, therefore, there was
a need for more reflexive, flexible, and adaptable forms of societal
integration. But this need was only one aspect of the cultural crisis.
The other aspect for Dewey, as I have shown, was the problem -of
meaning: the need to understand the significance for politics and
society of recent developments in science and the economy, as well
as the need to recover, reinterpret, and criticallyappropriate the val-
ues and ideals of our "national democratic tradition.T" Dewey's
theories of democracy and education were also responsive to this
other aspect of the crisis. In fact, for Dewey, resolution of the prob-
lem of meaning preceded the problem of integration in order of
importance. Construed as planning and public problem-solving,
democratic politics was parasitic upon continuing inquiry into the
actual and potential consequences, desirable and undesirable, of
modern institutional and intellectual developments. But the conduct
of such inquiry-articulation of personal troubles, public problems,
and planning objectives, as well as defending criteria of desirabil-
ity-depended upon the meaning of the appropriated values and
ideals to whose realization the machinery of government and the
process of education were subordinate."
The values and ideals to be revised and restated in light of modern
conditions were democracy "as a way of life," liberty, equality, and
community." The principal resource and starting point for this herme-
neutical task of was the democratic republicanism of Thomas
jefferson." The "new version" of these ideals were to be integrated
into a modern "social philosophy" expressing a distinct "moral out-
look" and envisioning "a deliberately preferred social order" or re-
gime." Dewey's complementary theories of democracy and educa-
tion were examples of this kind of philosophy-actually, they were
his contributions to a modern public philosophy for the nation. Given
the inertia of antiquated habits and modes of thought, and given the
power of the capitalist class to obstruct progressive change, Dewey
knew that truly modern forms of democracy and education would
not materialize automatically however reasonable they might be from
moral and sociological points view:59 His own political activities and
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observations, particularly during the 1930s, convinced Dewey that
the institutionalization of the "preferred social order" depended upon
political mobilization for the "radical" reconstruction of American cul-
ture and society.60
Conclusion: Dewey and Regime .Analysis
I stated earlier that Dewey was not, strictly speaking, a regime
theorist. He gives readers neither a detailed portrait of a good
society nor a comprehensive historical and institutional descrip-
tion of the American regime. Nevertheless, there are embedded
in his writings proposals for both normative and descriptive tracks
of regime analysis." In "Philosophy and Democracy" (1918), articu-
lating the contours of a good society is a project for philosophers:
[WJhatmakes philosophy hard work and also makes its cultiva-
tion worth while, is precisely the fact that it assumes the re-
sponsibility for setting forth some ideal ofa collective good life
by the methods which the best science ofthe day employs in its
quite different task, and with the use of the characteristic
knowledge of its day.62
Setting forth such an ideal and describing the set of institutions
that would be required to achieve it is an exercise in normative
regime analysis. Throughout his career the label Dewey gives to
his own ideal-to his own "view of a deliberately preferred social
order"-is democracy; that is to say, democracy as a "way of life"
rather than simply a form of government.f Dewey insists, however,
that his statement of this ideal is not merely a private preference, but
rather a reasonable interpretation of core values in the American
political tradition.
The purpose of normative regime analysis is to oudine-however
tentatively-the set ofeconomic, social, and political institutions that
can be expected to realize and embody the moral and political values
of the "good life." At the end of Spheres of Justice (1983) Michael
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Walzer sketches a regime that coheres with his own conception of
justice as "complex equality":
a decentralized democratic socialism, a strong welfare state
run, at least in part by local and amateur officials; a con-
strained market; an open and demystified civil service; in-
dependent public schools; the sharing of hard work and free
time; the protection of religious and family life; a system of
public honoring and dishonoring free of considerations of
rank or class; workers' control of companies and factories;
a politics of parties, movements, meetings, and public de-
bate. But institutions of this sort are of little use unless they
are inhabited by men and women who feel at home within
them and are prepared to defend them."
Dewey would have endorsed Walzer's sketch. But nowhere in
Dewey's writings is there a summary like Walzer's to be found.
What can be found are statements in which Dewey positions his
democratic socialism-what he call "liberal socialism"-to the left
of the New Deal, but clearly continuous with the liberal tradition."
Absent in Walzer's sketch, but present in Dewey's sometimes cryptic
projections, is the idea ofplanning-an idea that is not totally incom-
patible with markets." However, whether the subject is liberal social-
ism or planning, Dewey emphatically differentiates his methodology
of regime analysis from orthodox Marxism and from the "authori-
tarian socialism" of the Soviet Union." He was aware of the "dan-
ger ... that in ... get[ting] away from the evils of private economic
collectivism ['state capitalism'] we [could] plunge into political eco-
nomic collectivism ['state socialism'[J'" Like Walzer's sketch we find
statements in Dewey's writings to the effect that a democratic way
of life requires a type of citizen whose character is shaped by demo-
cratic institutions and who, therefore, "feel[s] at home within them.?" .
Democratic socialism requires, according to Dewey, a "new indi-
vidualism." But like the substance of this new type, Dewey is reluc-
tant to give readers more than glimpses of what the institutional
profile of democratic socialism is: "I am not anxious to depict the
form which this emergent individualism will assume. Indeed, I do
not see how it can be described until more progress has been made
in its production."70
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Discourse about a desirable future is not to be spun out of thin
air. The case for its desirability-as well as its feasibility-has to
be anchored in the cultural and institutional history as well as
the developmental tendencies of the existing regime. A desirable
future that is also socially, politically, and technologically pos- ..
sible must be immanent in the institutions and practices of the
existing society," We do not start from scratch. Contemporary cul-
ture and institutions, clarified and criticized through the disciplined
exercise ofsociological imagination, provide the material out ofwhich
a desirable and feasible society can be created. The normative track
of regime analysis, therefore, requires and builds upon the descrip-
tive one."
In two essays on the philosophy of education written with John L.
Childs, Dewey argues that education broadly conceived should be
informed not only by a view of the good life, but also by an accurate
account of the existing regime. Any comprehensive philosophy of
education remains formal and abstract [that] is not applied to some
particular society existing at a definite time and place. Factors of
time and place do not receive recognition as long as nominal social
conceptions of education are not connected to the concrete facts of
family, industry, business, politics, church, [and] science, in this coun-
try. If we are not to be content with formal generalities ... they must
be translated into descriptions and interpretations of the life which
actually goes on in the United States today for the purpose of deal-
ing with forces which influence and shape it.73
These "descriptions and interpretations"-th.e historical and empiri-
cal track of regime analysis-should have "both a critical and con-
structive side." As an exercise in social criticism, they should expose
and clarify ideologies, institutions and practices which undermine
democracy and "the American tradition of equal opportunity" for
individual self-realization." In Liberalism and SocialAction (1935), for
example, Dewey provides a history of laissez-faire liberalism as an
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ideological impediment to the creation of a democratic way of life.75
In Individualism} Old andNew (1929-30) he argues that an increasingly
money-driven, acquisitive culture has "obscured and crowded out ..
. the spiritual factor[s] of our tradition, [namely,] equal opportunity .
.. , free association and intercommunication ... , and the develop-
ment of individualities ...."76 In this earlierwork there is a critique
of the bureaucratic workplace. Managerialdictatorship and Tayloristic
procedures stunt the intellectual and moral development ofworkers
and consequently their growth as citizens." At the core of Dewey's
social criticism in these two works and elsewhere is his belief that
under the domination of a capitalist economy, and the elites who
own and control it, American democracy has atrophied arid "an
abundant cultural development for all" has been thwarted. In Free-
dom and Culture (1939) Dewey states: ''The idea of a pre-established
harmony between the existing so-called capitalistic regime and de-
mocracy is as absurd a piece of metaphysical speculation as human
history has ever evolved.Y"
According to Dewey, however, the existing society cannot be
reduced to its capitalist attributes. "It is simply false," he states,
"that this country, even politically,is merelya capitalisticdemocracy."?
The purpose of the constructive side of descriptive analysis is to
disclose those indigenous cultural, organizational, and technological
resources that could be developed, redesigned, and used to subordi-
nate production for profit to the· common good, replace bureau-
cracy, and create a truly democratic society. In addition to demo-
cratic ideals associated with the names of Jefferson and Lincoln,
Dewey argues in Liberalism andSocia!Action (1935), there is a strain of
humanitarian liberalism more compatible with democracy than its
laissez-faire counterpart, and rooted in romanticism rather than utili-
tarianism, that could be relied upon for moral and political guid-
ance." There is also modern science and technologywhich, if it could
be severed from its subservience to capitalism, could provide the
material security necessary for equal access to the cultural resources
necessary for individual self-development." As I indicated earlier,
Dewey believed.the practice of science, properly understood, could
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contribute both to the creation of a "planning," deliberately "self-
repairing" society, and to the formation of democratic,
nonbureaucratic, learning organizations in the economy, government,
and in society at large. Moreover, there was precedence for planning
in the operation of not only of the War Industries Board during
World War I, but also the largest corporations and financial institu-
. tions.82
The constructive side of descriptive regime analysis discloses
within the existing society the foundation upon which a desir-
able regime can be created. It provides the material for the exer-
cise of political imagination, judgment, and institutional design
that constitutes good society thinking. Driving both descriptive and
normative tracks is a set of moral and political convictions. Social
philosophy, Dewey maintains,
embodiers] not colorless intellectual readings of reality, but
men's most passionate desires and hopes, their basic beliefs
about the sort of life to be lived. They start . . . not from
science, not from ascertained knowledge, but from moral
convictions, and then resort . . . to the best knowledge and
the best intellectual methods available in their day to give
the form of demonstration to what [is] essentially an atti-
tude of will or moral resolution to prize one mode of life
more highly than another, and the wish to persuade other
men that this [is] the wise way of living.H3
Dewey'S commitment to democracy as a way of life was unwaver-
ing. So too was his commitment to individual freedom and equal
opportunity for individual self-development-liberal ideals he be-
lieved were at the core of the American political tradition." These
commitments and beliefs are necessary but insufficient conditions
for placing Dewey in the company of critical social theorists. What
really places him in this company are his judgments that capitalism
and the culture it produces are the principal impediments to the real-
ization of these ideals, and that the creation of some form of home-
grown, democratic socialism is the appropriate path of deliberate
social reconstruction.
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What Dewey calls social or political philosophy, and actually
produces in works like Indioidualism, Old and New (1929-30)
and Freedom and Culture (1939), is, in fact, critical theory. There
is the same integration of philosophical, social scientific, and
imaginative dimensions. Nevertheless, the synthesis of descrip-
tive and normative analyses, Dewey was clearly aware, differen-
tiates his practice of social philosophy (or critical theory) from
the social sciences upon which it relies, and from purely specula-
tive utopian thought," Repeating the words of SeylaBenhabib, what
we have in Dewey'S political writings is a "project ... situated be-
tween practical philosophy and social science, sharing and radically
reformulating the intentions of both."86
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Notes
1 Of course the meaning of justice, liberty, and democracy is contested among
intellectuals and the broader public. Prominent conservative liberals like Friedrich
Hayek and Milton Friedman seek also to educate citizens in the name of these
ideals. In their case, however, justice, liberty, and democracy bear a meaning fully
compatible with free market capitalism. By contrast, critical theorists are sensitive
to the tensions, if not incompatibility between capitalism in all its forms and the
realization of these values when the latter are properly understood. Historically
such sensitivity has led to advocating some form of social democracy, socialism, or
communism. Broadly conceived, however, critical social theory is not bounded by
Marxism or the Frankfurt School. It includes also the contributions ofnonrnarxists
like G. D. H. Cole, R H. Tawney, Lewis Mumford, John Dewey, Karl Polanyi, C.
Wright Mills, and Michael Walzer.
2 Brian Fay, Critical Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) p. 4;
cf., pp. 2, 23, 26, 28, 39, 205-06.
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entitled" The Critical Theory of Society: Between Practical Philosophy and Social
Science" is outstanding. An earlier recognition of the continuity of practical phi-
losophy and critical theory appears in Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans.
John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 41-42. ..
7 C. Wright Mills, Sociological IOJagination (New York: Oxford University Press,
1959), pp. 8-13, 129-31,149, 157, 163,177, 184-85, 187, 226; idem., Pouer, Po~itics,
& People, Edited and introduced by Irving L. Horowitz (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1963), pp. 245, 253, 384, 395-402; idem., The Marxists (New York: Dell
Publishing Co.: 1962), pp. 37-38.
B Raymond Geuss, TheIdea of A Critical Social Theory: Habermas andtheFrankftlrl
School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 2-3, 55, 58-65, 68, 70-
76, 80-84, 87-88; Jean L. Cohen, Class and Civil Society: l~he Umits of Marxian
Critical Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 29-36, 43-
52, 148-49, 154-55, 164, 169-79, 180, 186-87, 191-92, 196, 224, 227; Benhabib,
Critique, Norm} and Utopia (1986), pp. 7-9, 22-33, 45-55, 66-67, 105-08, 121-23,
153-54, 171-76.
9 Bowles and Gintis, Democracy & Capitalis»: (1986), p. 185 (my emphasis).
Mills also emphasizes the importance of discerning developmental tendencies and
possible trajectories: see The Sociological Imagination (1959)., pp. 151-53, 174. ..
10 I am fully aware that these assertions about comnutment appear to pOSIt10n
my argument on the "contextualist" side of the contemporary debate in political
theory between (foundationalist) liberalism and (contextualist or historicist)
communitarianism. Among critical theorists this debate is reflected in the philo-
sophical differences between the "quasi-transcendental" political .ethics of jur?en
Habermas and the "connected criticism" of Michael Walzer. I believe a defensible
form of naturalism and a view of inquiry that builds on the legacy of classical
pragmatism, and John Dewey in particular, is able to steer a reasonable (and, for
critical theory; an indispensable) course between the extremes in this debate. Steven
Smith's opening chapter in Hegel} Critique of Uberalism (1989) provides a goo~
introduction to this debate as does Ian Shapiro in Political Criticism (Berkeley: Unl-
versity of California, 1990). Shapiro's conception of "principled criticism" b~ed
on "critical naturalism" and "philosophical realism" is more friendly to classical
pragmatism than it is to the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty, Robert ~tonio
defends Dewey's historicism against the trans historical ethics of Habermas in "The
Normative Foundations of Emancipatory Theory: Evolutionary versus Pragmatic
Perspectives," .American journal of Sociology 94 Oanuary, 1989), pp. 721-48. In her
friendly critique of Haberrnas's ethics Benhabib has argued that only concrete cul-
tural traditions of specific societies can provide substantive content to political
ideals like justice, liberty, and democracy; See Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia
(1986), pp. 260, 262-63, 279, 288-98, 306, 319-22, 326, 335~36: ..
11 Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity andInnovation tn Western Politico!
Thought, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company: 1960), pp. 19-20. See also William
Galston, Justice and the Human Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1980),
pp. 14-15 and Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia (1986), pp. 4, 5, 7, 14, 142, 225-
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3 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Denlocrary and Capitalisnl (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1986) p. 184.
4 It would take a book to defend this paragraph. As a feeble alternative, I will .
merely cite a few books and articles that lend credibility to the argument: Ellen
Meiksins Wood, Mind and Politics: An Approach to theMeaning of Liberaland Socialist
Individualisnl (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Raymond Williams
Culture andSocie!): 1780-1950 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958); Charles Tay-
lor,Hegel (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), chap. l;James T. Kloppenberg,
Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressiuiss: in European and.American Thought,
1870-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Ruth Levitas, The Concept
of Utopia (Syracuse University Press, 1990); David Held, Models of Den,ocraey, 2d
ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Paul Tillich, The Socialist Decision,
trans.Franklin Sherman (New York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1977); Alvin W Gouldner,
For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1973), chap. 2; idenl., Against Fragolentation: The Onginsof Marxism and Sociology of
Intellectl/als (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Dmitri N. Shalin, "Ro-
manticism and the Rise of Sociological Hermeneutics," Social Research 53 (Spring,
1986),pp. 77-123; E. P. Thompson, "Romanticism, Moralism, and Utopianism: the
Case of William Morris," New Left Review #99 (Sept.-Oct., 1976), pp. 83-111; Paul
Breines, "Marxism, Romanticism, and the Case of Georg Lukas: Notes on Some
Recent Sources and Situations," Sttldies in Romanticis»: 16 (Fall, 1977), pp. 473-89;
Michael Lowy, "Marcuse and Benjamin: The Romantic Dimension," Telos #44
(Summer,1980), pp. 25-33; idem., ''The Romantic and Marxist Critique of Modern
Civilization," Theory and Society 16 (1987), pp. 891-904; Robert Sayre and Michael
Lowy, "Figures of Romantic Anti-Capitalism," Nelli German Critique #32 (Spring-
Summer, 1984), pp. 42-93.
5 On the idea of "practical philosophy," see Fred R Dallmayr, Polis andPraxis:
Exercises in Contenporary Political Theory (Cambridge, :rvIA: lVIIT Press, 1984) pp. 10,
41-45, 59-60, 72-73. Steven B. Smith recognizes the roots of Hegel's political
theory in the tradition of practical philosophy in Hegel} Critique of Liberalisnl: Rights
illContext (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) pp. 13, 132-40. In identify-
ing the intellectual origins of Max Weber's sociology in the German Historical
School of political economy, Wilhehn Hennis argues for the continuity between
practical philosophy and Weber's project (see Max Weber: Essays in ReconSInJctiolJ,
translated by Keith Tribe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988) chap. 3. David Kettler -
positions Karl Mannheim in the same historical and political-theoretical context in
"Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy: The Place of Traditional Prob-
lems in the Formation of Mannheim's Thought," Political Science QuarterlY 82 (Sep-
tember, 1967) pp. 399-425. See also Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983); Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivisnl and
RelativislJI: Scie/lce, Hermeneutics, and Praxis ( Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 1983) pp. 188-190; and Stephen Toulmin, ''The Recovery of Practical
Philosophy," The .Amencan Scholar 57 (Summer, 1988), pp. 337-52.
6 SeylaBenhabib, Critique, Norm, & Utopia: A Sttldy of theFoundations of Critical
Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) pp. 2-3; her introduction
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26, 324-34, 336-39, 352-53; Ruth Levitas, "Marxism, Romanticism, and Utopia:
Ernst Bloch and William Morris," Radical PhiJosopf?y #51 (Spring, 1989), pp. 27-36.
12 Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia (1986), p. 226.
13 Ibid., p. 226; cf., pp. 142, 227, 253.
14 Ibid., p. 5.
15 Geuss, The Idea of A Critical Theory (1981), p. 55; cf., pp. 56, 79-80.
16 Max Weber, Tbe lYlethodoiogy of the Social Sciences, Translated and Edited by
Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949),
pp. 11, 14-15, 17-18, 20-22, 24, 33-34, 53-58, 60, 76-78, 80-84, 90, 143-52; Mills,
The Sociological Imagination (1959), pp. 129-31, 173-74, 177. See also Mary Hesse,
"Theory and Value in the Social Sciences" in Christopher Hookway and Philip Pettit
(eds.), Action and Interpretation: Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 1-16; and Susan James, TheContent of
Social Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
17 While Bowles and Gintis in the first chapter of Dell,ocracy and Capitalism
(1986) bracket metatheory, they unabashedly, and appropriately, confess to allowing
their moral and political commitments to set the theoretical agenda of their book.
18 See Mills, The Sociologicalll1lagination (1959), pp. 179-81, 188-92; David
Kettler, "The Vocation of Radical Intellectuals," Politics and Society 1 (Novem-
ber, 1970), pp. 23-49; Frank Lentricchia, Cnticis»: and Social Change (Chicago. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 1983), pp. 2, 6-13, 19, 26, 32, 34-36, 39-40, 50-51; Michael
Walzer, The Conlpany of Critics.' Social Criticism and Political Commitmen« in
the Twentieth Centltry (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988), chaps. 1 and 13;
and Nancy Fraser, UnrulY Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), "Introduction: Apolo-
gia For Academic Radicals," pp. 1-13.
19 Should critical theory address a class-based audience: nonprofessional work-
ers (unionized or not?), the new middle class, the underclass? Should targeted
citizens be members of "new social movements" already politically motivated and
mobilized? Should critical theorists try to communicate with as wide as a public as
possible? The roots of this debate are as old as the conflict between Marx and
utopian socialists. See the discussion in Cohen, Class andCivilSociety (1982); and
Mills, The Sociological Imagination (1959), pp. 184-86, 190-92.
2D Geuss, Idea of A Critical Theory (1981), pp. 65, 79-81, 85-86, 89-92. As
Richard Wolin has argued, these conditions are also psychological insofar as
theories "neglectfmg] the sentient and emotional aspects of human action," both
in concept and in mode of presentation "result in [a] failure to provide suffi-
cient inducement or motivational inspiration to command the allegiance of its
potential addressees." See his "Critical Theory and the Dialectic of Rational-
ism," New Germa» Critiqee #41 (Spring-Summer, 1987), p. 52.
21 These two questions are not identical. The first is asking about the actual
social consequences of the project. The second is asking about the characteristics
and quality of the project in relation to its underlying purpose.
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22 What I am calling for is a reexamination of what Gouldner called the
"sentiments," background" and "domain" assumptions of the project of critical
social theory. He called these elements the "infrastructure" of sociology. I am
calling for a metatheoretical examination of the infrastructure of critical theory.
See Alvin W. Gouldner, The COOling Crisis of Western Sociology (New York:
Basic Books, 1970), pp. 7-8, 20-21, 28-54; and idem., The TIJJO Marxisms (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 39-44, 58-59, 309-13. Another book,
of course, is not a substitute either for an actual realignment of critical theory
with its moral and political objectives, or for the strategic thinking, action, and
organizational innovation necessary for intellectual integration and for popular
enlightenment and political mobilization.
23 See Mills, The Sociological Imagination (1959), pp. 177-226; James A. Henretta,
"Social .History and Lived and Written," American Historical RevielJJ 84 (December,
1979), pp. 1314-22.
24 A mainstream Marxist approach to the history ofcapitalism that builds upon
Kondratieff long-wave theory is taken by Ernest Mandel in Late Capitalism (Lon-
don: NLB, 1975) and in Long Waves of Capitalist Development: The Marxist Interpreta-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Another approach, rooted in
Marxism, is that of the French "Regulation School," Robert Boyer, a leading mem-
ber of this group of theorists, surveys their work in The Regulation SchooL' A Critical
Introduction, translated by Craig Charney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990). Yet a third perspective identifies the phases of capitalism with successive
"social structures of accumulation." For purposes of historical periodization, this
approach is sympathetic to the long-wave theories of both Kondratieff and
Schumpeter. In Segnlented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of
Laborill the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), David M.
Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich build a theory of intemationaJ
capitalist development and then apply it to the U. S. case. Each successive social
structure of accumulation can be viewed at a level that abstracts from national
peculiarities; but each can also he given a national identity. The American regime at
any point in its history is a larger and more complex and decentered totality than its
social structure of accumulation. However, any critical social theory addressed to
American citizens must recognize the nation's social structure of accumulation as
the dynamic core of the regime. What's intriguing about their work is that their use
of theory to understand and periodize American labor history materializes at a
regime specific level of abstraction. See also David M. Kotz, Terrence Mcfkmough,
and Michael Reich, eds. , Social Structures of .Accamuiation: The Political Econo1!!} of
Growth and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
25 Three recent comparative and, to some extent, historical analyses could
prove useful for the project of critical social theory: Jeffrey A. Hart examines
national formations of capitalism in Rival Capitalists.' International Competi-
tiveness in the United States, Japan, and W'Cs/ern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1992); David ~1. Gordon suggests that the organization of work and the relations
between labor and capital vary with nationally distinct forms of capitalism in Fat
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and Mean: The Corporate Sqtleeze of Working .Americans and the Myth of Atlanagerial
HDownsizing n (New York: M~tinKessler Books, 1996); and Gosta Esping-Andersen
in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990) differentiates three types of welfare-state regime each of which is linked to
an historically and culturally distinct path of development
26 In addition to institutional histories of the workplace provided by Gordon,
Edwards, and Reich (1982) and Gordon (1996), analysis of the American regime
could draw upon institutional histories of the polity (a more inclusive concept than
the state), business, law; class formation, education, the "culture industry," the
professions, voluntary organizations, an the family. Analysis of the American re-
gime could also profit conceptually and methodologically from James Livingston's
integration of political economics and cultural studies in PragolatisHI andthePolitical
Econo1J!] of Cultural Revolution, 1850-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
lina Press, 1994). Finally, the proposal for integrating the fragmented discipline of
American history put forth by Thomas Bender is fully compatible with regime
analysis. See Thomas Bender, "Wholes and Parts: The Need For Synthesis in Ameri-
can History," Journal of .American History 73 aune, 1986), pp. 120-36.
zt Karol Edward Soltan and Stephen L. Elkin, eds., The Constitution of Good
Societies (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 186, 187,
197. Soltan and Elkin edited a similar volume in 1993: A New ConstitutionaiisHI:
Designing Political Institutions Fora Good Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
All the essays in both books contribute to the project of good society analysis.
28 Bowles and Gintis, Democracy and Capitaliss: (1986), p. 185.
29 Jeffrey A. Alexander, "Modern, Anti, Post, and Neo," New Left Ret,'iew #210,
(March/April, 1995), pp. 68, 70. "In response to continuing social change:' Alexander
asserts, "generational shifts [among theorists] occur that can make the scientific and
ideological efforts of earlier generations seem not only empirically implausible but
psychologically shallow, politically irrelevant, and morally obsolete." Ibid., pp. 79-
80; cf., 77-79, 81-82, 86, 101.
30 Fred Block, Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique ofEconomic Discourse (Berke-
ley: University of California Press 1990), p. 2. Block continues: "While there are
complex mediations between high social theory and every day "common sense,' the
two are connected in important ways." Presumably these "mediations" require the
craftsmanship of professional journalism as well as the pedegogical skills of formal
and adult education. See also Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory:
Critical Inte"ogations (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991), pp. 259-60; and Krishan
Kumar (1995), From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contem-
porary IP'orld (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. vii, 4.
31 The meaning of "historicism" has become so contested in current academic
discourse that some authors refuse to use the term. For my purposes I find historian
David A. Hollinger's identification of historicism with "historicity" an acceptable
and useful perspective. He writes: " By histoni:ity, I mean simply the contingent,
temporally and socially situated character of our beliefs and values, of our institu-
tions and practices. When we accept our own historical particularity, we shy away
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from essentialist constructions of human nature, from transcendentalist arguments
about it, and from timeless rules for justifying claims about it. We eschew the
Archimedean perspective, and we instead inquire outward from our experience. We
practice immanent, rather than transcendental, critique. We confront the insight
that truths and rights and obligations become available to us-and thus, it is appar-
ently easy to conclude, come into existence for us-through the operation of
historically contingent communities of human beings." David A. Hollinger, "How
Wide the Circle of the "We'" in Scientific Atlthoriry & Twentieth Century America,
edited by Ronald G. Walters (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p.
16.
32 For a reading of Dewey as an historicist see Koppenberg Uncertain Victory
(1986); Antonio, "The Normative Foundations of Emancipatory Theory: Evolu-
tionary Versus Pragmatic Perspectives," (1989). .American Journal of Sociology, 94
Oanuary), pp. 721-48.
33 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosopf?y, Enlarged edition (Boston: Beacon
Press, [1920] 1957), pp. 188, 189, 200.
34 Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory (1986), pp. 101, 107-14, 152, 156, 334-35,
412.
35John Dewey, "Need For A Recovery of Philosophy," in Creative Intelligence, by
John Dewey et al. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917), p. 65; cf., pp. 4-5';
idem; Reconstruaio» in Philosopf?y, enlarged ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1920 [1957]),
pp. 21, 22, 26; idem., Democraiy and Edt/cation: An Introduction to the Philosop!?y of
Education (New York: The Free Press, 1916), pp. 328-29, 331-32; idem.; "Context
and Thought," (1931) in John Dewry On Experience, Nature, andAction, edited by
Richard J. Bernstein (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960) p. 105; idem., The
Middle fl7orkJ; 1899-1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydson (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1976-83), rv p. 36; IX, p. 338, X, p. 47; XII, p. 260, 266,273-77;
idem., The Later WorkJ; 1925-1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydson (Carbondale: South-
ern Illinois University Press, 1981-92), III, pp. 115-16; VIII, p. 30; XII, p.274.
36 Dewey, Reconstruction in Pbilosopby, p. 26. In ThePublic andIts Problems (1927),
Dewey argues that problems become public when citizens become conscious of the
negative consequences (often unintended) of social interaction in the economy and
other quasi-public spaces,· and recognize that solutions require collective action
and/or public policy. Despite his criticism of Dewey, Mills' discussion of troubles
and issues simply resonates with Dewey's ideas and rhetoric. A good example
appears in an essay entitled ''The Complacent Young Men" (1958) where he writes .
that there is an "unmet need" for intellectuals "(1) to formulate private troubles out
of the vague uneasiness of individuals; (2) to make public issues out of indifference
and malaise; [and] (3) to pick up both the uneasiness and the indifference-formu-
lated as troubles and issues--in problems open to inquiry." See C. Wright Mills,
Power, Politics andPeople (1963), p. 387.
37 Dewey, "Need For A Recovery of Philosophy" (1917), p. 67.
38 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright rvIills, trans. and eds., From Max Weber: Essays ill
Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 280. Dewey would have
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added the concepts of "habit" and "desire" to Weber's two types of interest and,
like Weber, he would have insisted on the social sources of these motivational
factors.
39 John Dewey, Freedos: and Culture (New York: Capricorn Press, 1939), pp. 52,
60-61, 72-63, 123; idem; Later Works, XI, pp. 55-57. Dewey was also concerned
about the connections between material and ideal interests: "[T]he habit of separat-
ing economic interests from ideal interests affords a typical instance of the too
common separation ofmeans and ends with the result that ideals become empty and
impotent, while means left to themselves in isolation from service to ends, produce
brutal and unjust consequences." LAterWorks, VIII, p. 85; XI, pp. 62-65.
40 Gerth and ~Iills, ProHI Max Weber (1946), p. 281. In Dewey's Quest .For
Certainty (1929) it is not simply traditional religious conceptions of nature,
man, and society that modern science makes obsolete, but also the Newtonian
world- view and the political and social theories based on it.
41 Dewey, Reconstruction In Philosop!?J (1920/1957), p. 26.
42 LaterWorks, I, p. 40; VIII, p. 29. Charles S. Peirce and Hans-Georg Gadamer
hold similar views.
43 Later Works, V, pp. 163-64; I, p. 305. In "Authority and Social Change"
(1936) Dewey writes of the "foes against which [criticism has] had to make its
way: the foes of inertia, of old, long-established traditions and habits- ... all ...
entrenched in forms of institutional life that are effulgent with the prestige of time,
that are enveloped in the glamour of imaginative appeal and that are crowned,
severally and collectively with an emotional halo made of the values that men most
prize." Later Works, XI, p. 141.
44 Ibid., VIII, pp. 29-30.
4S Ibid., I, pp. 296-301, 304-06, 308, 326; c£, VIII, p. 25; John Dewey, Theory
ofValuation in International Encyclopedia ofUnified Science, vol. II, number 4,
edited by Otto Neurath (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 57-58.
46 Later Works, III, p. 127; c£, Reconstruction In Pbilosopby (1920/1957), pp. 38-
44.
47 Later Works, III, p. 127; cf., DeHlocraq and Education (1916), p. 83. Looking
at the world in the aftermath of the First World War, Dewey wrote in his Gifford
Lectures, QtlestFor Certainty (1929): "Conditions and forces that dominate in actual
fact the modern world have not attained any coherent intellectual expression of
themselves." (p, 77; cf., 312-13). Of urgent concern was the exploration of the
meaning-what Weber, echoing Nietzche's Genealogy of Morals, called "cultural
significance"-of modern science. In "Context and Thought" (1931) Dewey said
"The place of science in life, the place of its peculiar subject matter in the wider
scheme of materials we experience, is a more ultimate function of philosophy to
[discern] than is any self-contained reflection upon science as such." (p. 108) The
search for meaning should replace the quest for certainty. In this respect, philosophy
cooperates with science appropriately construed: "All knowledge, all science, . . .
aims to grasp the meaning of objects and events. nus process always consists in
taking them out of their apparent brute isolation as events, and fmding them to be
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part of some larger whole suggested by them, which, in turn, accounts for, explains,
interprets them; i.e., renders them significant." How We Think in Middle Works, VI,
p. 272; see also 273-85. All of this is background for a bold statement in the essay
"Philosophy and Civilization" (1927): "Meaning is wider in scope as well as more
precious in value than is truth, and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than
with truth." Later Works, III, p. 4; cf., 5, 8-9; see also Middle Works, XI, pp. 43-44,
47.
48 Later l17orks, p. 130; cf., 127-28, 131; Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920/
1957), pp. 26-27. This hermeneutical dimension of Dewey's philosophy is
clearly stated in "Education and New Social Ideals," a radio speech delivered in
1936: "The point I want most to emphasized is that fundamentally and inherently
the social ideals that demand a change in education are not new They are a new
version of the very same ideals ['democracy,' 'liberty,' "equality'] that inspired the
Declaration of Independence one hundred and sixty years ago. A new version is
needed because of the enormous social changes that have taken place in this period
of time. . . . [The new version is] new only in relation to the method and means
demanded in order that the ideals may be realized." Later Works, XI, p. 167; cf., pp.
29-30, 35-38, 168, 292, 370-71; VIII, pp. 55, 57-58, 65, 82-84.
49 Later WJ'orks, I, p. 306. Contemporary philosophy is to take over a role
previously played by theology. Philosophy as a "generalized medium of inter-
communication" is powerfully restated in the concluding pages of Quest For
Certainty (1929) and then again in a short piece entitled "Philosophy" pub-
lished in El1qclopedia of theSocial Sciences (1934): ''There is a kind of music of ideas
that appeals, apart from any question of empirical verification, to the minds of
thinkers, who derive emotional satisfaction from an imaginative play synthesis of
ideas obtainable by them in no other "\vay. The objective side of this phenomenon
is the role of philosophy in bringing to a focus of unity and clarity the ideas that are
at work in a given period more or less independently of one another, in separate
cultural streams. . . . The significance of such synthesizing ideas is more or less
independent of verifiabilty; The human mind, taken collectively, experiences the
need of holding itself together, and during periods of rapid influx of new materials
and the inception ofnew and diverging tendencies, accomplishes this task by means
of comprehensive speculative ideas." Later Works, VIII, p. 38. Finally, this theme
plays a role in Dewey's political theory: " The problem of creatling a] genuine
democracy cannot be successfully dealt with in theory or in practice save as we
create intellectual and moral integration out of present disordered conditions."
Freedom and Ctt/ture (1939). P 49.
50 Quest ForCertainty (1929), p. 43; c£, pp. 40, 44, 47-48, 70-71, 76-77. The
phrase is used again as a chapter heading and expounded in Individualism, Old
and New (1929-30) chap. 7 in The Later Works, V, pp. 99-110. This crisis in
modern culture was also a "crisis in liberalism;" See Liberal and Social Action
(1935) in chap. 2 of The Later Works, XI, pp. 23-40.
51 Later WJ'orks, ~ p. 143; Public and its Problems (1927), pp. 200-03; Freedom and
Culture (1939), pp. 52, 65, 72-73, 101-02, 128. As important as the concept of
"community of inquiry" is for Dewey's theory of democracy, it is important to
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recognize that both the concept and the theory are rooted in Dewey's philosophical
natururalism, ethics, and critical interpretation and appropriation of America's
political traditions. See Robert B. Westbrook, John Dew~ and .American De1l10crafY
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Matthew Festenstein, Praglliatism and
Political Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
52 Later Works, VIII, p. 74; c£, pp. 70, 72; and ibid., ~ p. 115; XIII, p. 321.
53 Ibid., XI, p. 231, 234-37; VIII, p., 69, 73; Public and its ProbieHiS (1927), pp.
154-55.
54 Ibid., VIII, pp. 48, 52.
55 Ibid., VIII, pp., 72-73, 82-84; XI, pp. 217-19, 231; Public and its ProbielliS
(1927), 143-44, 146; Freedom and Cult1Jre (1939), pp. 4-5, 50-51, 175-76.
56 Later Works, VIII, pp. 45-46,49-53,80-81; XI, pp. 167-68,217-22,225,
236-37, 368-71, 415-16; Democrary and Education (1916), 87, 122, 329, 331; Public
and Its Problems (1927), pp. 26, 39, 143-44, 156, 211-19; Freedom and Culture
(1939), pp. 4-5, 63-64, 123-25, 155-63.
57 The most explicit evidence of Dewey's affinity for Jefferson's participatory
republicanism appears in Freedom and Cllltlire (1939). To this evidence should be
added his Lincoln-like belief in the mora! superiority of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence over the Federal Constitution not merely as a founding document of the
nation, but also as an authoritative statement of definitive national ideals. Freedom
and CttltJlre (1939), pp. 4-5, 40, 52, 54, 155-65; Later Works, VIII, pp. 49-53; XI, pp.
64, 167-68,368-71; "Presenting Thomas Jefferson," in TheUving T'houghts ofTbomas
Jefferson, ed. John Dewey (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), pp. 1-30;
and idem., "Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Faith," Virginia QuarterlY Review
16(January, 1940), pp. 1-13. For a recent analysis of Jefferson's political philosophy
that corroborates Dewey's interpretation, see Richard K Matthews, The Radical
Politics of Thomas Jeffersol1 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986).
58 Later Works, XI, pp. 167-68; VIII, pp. 46, 80-81. .
59 Dewey rejected the idea of historical inevitability: "Commitment to inevita-
bility is always the fruit of dogma; intelligence does not pretend to know save as a
result of experimentation, the opposite of a preconceived dogma." Later Works,
XI, p. 55; c£, Freedom and Culture (1939), pp. 151, 173; Later Works, VIII, p. 70.
60 Later Works, VIII, p. 81; XI, pp. 44-45, 296-99.
61 The closest Dewey comes to regime theory and analysisis in his last book of
political philosophy, Freedon: and Culture (1939). Both descriptive and normative
tracks are interwoven in the book, but its purpose is to provide neither an extensive
account of the existing regime nor a utopian blueprint of a desirable future. His
purpose is to pose the problem ofwhat kind ofsociety or "culture"-understood a
set of interacting and mutually sustaining institutions and traditions-is necessary
for the creation and continuing reproduction of democracy and freedom. "For the
successfulworking ofdemocratic [institutions] ... and for individuals to be free, we
must see to it that suitable [cultural] conditions exist." (pp. 49, 34) Drawing upon
his reading of anthropology his argument is that we need a broad concept of
culture-his concept of regime-to even pose and examine the many dimensions
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of the problem: "The state of culture is a state of interaction of many factors, the
chief of which are law and politics, industry and commerce, science and technology,
the arts of expression and communication, and of morals, or the values men prize
and the ways in which they evaluate them; and finally, though indirectly, the system
of general ideas used by men to justify and to criticize the fundamental conditions
under which they live, their social philosophy." (p. 23) As necessary first steps in
understanding and responding to the problem of creating and sustaining a demo-
cratic way of life, both descriptive cultural (or regime) analysisat a concrete level of
historical specificity and good society thinking at the level of institutional design
and reconstruction is required.
62 Middle Works, XI, pp. 46-47 (my emphasis). "Such a vision [of a collective
good life]," Dewey states elsewhere, "is preliminary to action which willdevelop the
new society" Later Works, VIII, p. 72.
63 Ibid.,p. 81. Essays where Dewy draws the distinction between democracy as
a way of life and democratic government include "Democracy and Educational
Administration" (1937) in Later Works,XI, pp. 217-25, and "Creative Democracy-
The Task Before Us" in Ibid., xrv pp. 224-30. This distinction is also a central
theme of both The Public andIts Problems (1927) and Freedom andCulture (1939). See
also Denlocracy andEducation (1916), p. 87 and Later lJ7orks, VIII, pp. 49-50; XI, pp.
236-37,416-17. A helpful article by JohnJ. Stuhr entitled "Democracy as a Wayof
Life" appears in John J. Stuhr, ed., Philosop~ and the Reconstruction of Culture: Prag-
matic Essays after Dew~. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp.
37-57.
64 Michael \Valzer, Spheres of Justice: A DifCnse of Pluralis»: and Equality (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983). P. 318.
65 Later Works, XI, pp. 45-61, 258-60, 285-95, 489-95; Freedom and Culttlre
(1939), pp. 68-73.
66 In a 1937 review of Walter Lippmann's An Inquiry Into The Principles of the
GoodSode!) in which Dewey defends liberal socialism against the charge of being
another form ofauthoritarian socialism, he states: ''That a free and open market for
the consumer would be the economic mark of a free society I no more doubt than I
doubt that a free society would be one of equal reciprocal rights and duties." Later
lJ7orks, XI, p.491. Richard Rorty's own position capmres Dewey'Sview: "There is
nothing sacred about either the free market or about central planning: the proper
balance between the two is a matter of experimental tinkering." Richard Rorty,
''Thugs and Theorists, A Reply to Bernstein," Political Theory, 15 (November, 1987),
p.565. .
67 For Dewey's critique of orthodox Marxism see Freedom and Culture (1939),
pp. 12-14, 16-18, 23-29, 32-34, 39-40, 51-53, 73-78, 83-87, 93-100, 105-06, and
Later lJ7orks, XI, pp. 413-14; and for his aversion to authoritarian socialism see ibid.;
p. 288; V, p. 87; XIII, pp. 316-17; xrv pp. 91-94. In two recent articles Thelma Z.
Levine judges Dewey's position a variation of Marxism, refuses to recognize (as
Dewey did) a socialist alternative to the bureaucratic socialism of the Soviet Union,
and argues that the collapse of the latter, in effect, repudiates Dewey's normative
projections. See Thelma Z. Levine, "American Philosophy, Socialism, and the
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Contradictions of Modernity," in Philosopl!J andthe Reconstruction oj" Culmre: PragnJotic
Essays after Dew~, ed. John J. Stuhr. (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1993),pp. 1-15;and ''The Contemporary Significance of the American Philosophic
Tradition: Lockean and Redemptive," in Reading Deuey: Interpretationsfor a Postmodern
Generation, ed. Larry A. Hickman. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 217-
30.
68 Ibid., p. 94; cf., XI, pp. 140-41, 144; Freedonl and Culture (1939), pp. 68-73.
69 LaterWorks, XI, pp. 221, 225; xrv pp. 224-30.
7° IndividualisRJ, Oldand New (1929-30),p. 89. Robert Westbrook writes: "For
a philosopher who put democratic ideals at the center of his thinking, Dewey had
surprisingly little to say about democratic citizenship ... [or] the demanding condi-
tions he set for [the] the realization [of these ideals]." Westbrook, John Dewry and
.American DeoJocracy (1991), pp. 317, 318.
71 The ideal represents "intelligently thought-out possibilities of the existent
world which may be used asmethods for making over and improving it." Beconstruc-
tion in Philosopf?y (1920 [1957]), p. 122; cf., pp. 117-18, 121-24. Similarly, in Individu-
alism, Old andNew (1929-30) Dewey wrote: "Ideals express possibilities; but they
are genuine ideals only in so far as they are possibilities of what is now moving.
Imagination can set them free from their encumbrances and project them as a guide
in attention to what now exists. But save as they are related to actualities, they are
pictures in a dream." p. 112. See also TheQuest ForCertainry (1929), pp. 299-300,
302-03, 310-13; Theory of Evaluation (1939), pp. 39-40, 42-43, 49; ~liddle Works,
xrv pp. 161, 162; and LaterWorks, III, pp. 129-31; VIII, p. 46.
72 If we substitute "democratic socialism" for "commercial republic," this
passage from a recent exercise in normative regime analysis by Stephen L. Elkin
would be endorsed by Dewey: ''Whether we can more fully realize an Ameri-
can commercial republic depends very much on our institutional inheritance:
what the founders of this republic bequeathed to us as well as what succeeding
generations have put into place. Thus, we can reform ourselves-but not just as
we please, for there is no 'we' apart from the existing institutions that form us
as a people." (my emphasis) Stephen L. Elkin, "The Constitution of a Good
Society: The Case of the Commercial Republic," in Solton and Elkin eds., The --
Constitution of Good Societies (1996), p. 143.
73 The two essays are "The Socio-Economic Situation of Education" (1933)
and ''The Underlying Philosophy of Education" (1933). Both appear in The
Later Works, volume 8. The quotation is from pages 44-45. See also pp. 82-84.
Readers of Dewey should keep in mind that he considered "a philosophy of
education may ... truly be said to be general philosophy formulated with
particular reference to its social office." Ibid., p. 84.
74 Ibid., pp. 46, 48-49, 52-53, 64-66, 68-69, 97.
75 The '1\chilles heel" of laissez-faire liberalism, according to Dewey; is the'
belief that "the effective liberty and cultural development of the individuals.' ,·'.·'·T".'.'.EL·.'
that constitute society ... [can be] established by an unplanned and external
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convergence of separate individuals, each of whom is bent on personal private
advantage." Ibid., XI, p. 40.
76 Ibid., p. 49; cf., pp. 48, 55-57, 75-76, 84, 87, 89.
77 Ibid., pp. 101-04; cf., ibid., XI, pp. 221, 224-25; Democracy and Education
(1916), p. 85.
78 Later Works, VIII, p. 73; Freedos: and Culttlre (1939), p. 72; cf., p. 93; Later
Works., ~ pp. 84, 89. Dewey uses various labels for the existing regime: "a pecuniary
culture" (ibid., pp. 49, 55-56); "a money culture" (ibid., p. 55); "a regime of highly
centralized finance and industry" (ibid., XI, p. 252); "finance capitalism" (ibid., pp.
296, 371); and "private profit economic system" (ibid., p. 493) among others.
79 Ibid., p. 297.
80 Ibid., pp. 17-19,21, 24.
81 Ibid., pp. 42-43, 62-63; ~ pp. 86-87, 105-06; Freedom and Ctt/ture (1939), p.
143.
82 Later Works, V, p. 69; XIII, 309-15.
83 Midd/e Works, XI, p. 44. The fact that social philosophy begins with "passion-
ate desires ... hopes ... [and] moral convictions is, according to Dewey, a principal
reason for divergent philosophical or theoretical positions. Translating these desires,
hopes, and convictions into "an interpretation of man and nature on the basis of
some program ofcomprehensive aims and policies" produces different meanings for
core values like democracy, liberty, and justice. "Relativists and absolutists, radicals
and conservatives, spiritualists and materialists, differ primarily in their systems of
value and their strictly intellectual differences follow logically ... In spite of
conflicts[, however,] philosophy serves the purpose of clarifying the source of
opposition and the problems attendant upon it; while with some problems articula-
tion and clarification are more significant than formal solution." LaterWorks, VIII,
pp. 25, 27; c£, 26, 28-30; VII, pp. 176-78.
84 We get an idea of the nature of the "social liberalism" that animates Dewey's
attraction to a democratic socialist regime in this passage from UberaJism andSocial
Action (1935): [Cjivilization is faced with the problem of uniting the changes that
are going on into a coherent pattern of social organization. The liberal spirit is
marked by its own picture of the pattern that is required: a social organization that
will make possible effective liberty and opportunity for personal growth in mind
and spirit in all individuals. Its present need is recognition that established material
security is a prerequisite of the ends which it cherishes, so that, the basis of life
being secure, individuals may actively share in the wealth of cultural resources that
now exist and may contribute, each in his own way, to their further enrichment. ..
. Organized planning put into effect for the creation of an order in which industry
and finance are socially directed in behalf of institutions that provide the material
basis for the cultural liberation and growth of individuals, is now the sole method
of social action by which liberalism can realize its professed aims." LaterWorks, XI,
pp. 41,40.
85 Ibid., ~ pp. 163-65; VIII, pp. 35-39. Dewey links his practice of social
philosophy and the broad scope of its subject matter to the scope of "moral
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